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Abstract. Android malware is a persistent threat to billions of users
around the world. As a countermeasure, Android malware detection sys-
tems are occasionally implemented. However, these systems are often
vulnerable to evasion attacks, in which an adversary manipulates mali-
cious instances so that they are misidentified as benign. In this paper, we
launch various innovative evasion attacks against several Android mal-
ware detection systems. The vulnerability inherent to all of these systems
is that they are part of Androguard [34], a popular open source library
used in Android malware detection systems. Some of the detection sys-
tems decrease to a 0% detection rate after the attack. Therefore, the use
of open source libraries in malware detection systems calls for caution.
In addition, we present a novel evaluation scheme for evasion attack gen-
eration that exploits the weak spots of known Android malware detec-
tion systems. In so doing, we evaluate the functionality and malicious-
ness of the manipulated instances created by our evasion attacks. We
found variations in both the maliciousness and functionality tests of our
manipulated apps. We show that non-functional apps, while considered
malicious, do not threaten users and are thus useless from an attacker’s
point of view. We conclude that evasion attacks must be assessed for both
functionality and maliciousness to evaluate their impact, a step which is
far from commonplace today.
Keywords: Evasion attack · Android · Malware Detection.
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1 Introduction
Malware, or malicious software, is defined as any program or file that is harmful
to a computer user. Malware can appear in many forms, such as viruses, Tro-
jans, and worms. Among others, the Android OS is susceptible to this threat as
well. Android malware evolves over time and take many new forms, such that
malicious versions of the popular Android application PacKages (APKs) can
propagate to various Android markets. For example, Xhelper [132] was recently
shown to be sophisticated Android malware. It is able reinstall itself after the
uninstall process. In addition, it is designed to stay hidden as it does not create
an icon at the launcher. This app has infected over 45k devices in six months. It
does not require dangerous permissions from the user but instead operates based
on device events such as completion of the boot process. It incorporates persis-
tent connection to a C & C server to send actions to the device. In advance, it
was discovered by MalwareByte Labs [31] that some variations of Xhelper may
like the host so much that it may reinstall itself even after a factory reset of
the phone. The source of installation for the malware stated it was coming from
Google play. It is believed that something inside Google play triggers the quick
installation of the app. It is still considered a mystery.
Not all Android malware are as complex as Xhelper. But based on this ad-
vanced example and many others, a long list of researchers have reached the in-
evitable conclusion that Android malware detection is a major issue that should
be tackled by the security community [13, 25, 29, 35, 61, 94, 118, 120, 141]. As An-
droid malware detection is a subdomain of malware detection, general malware
detection methods apply to Android malware as well. One of the most popular
techniques in the malware detection domain is Machine Learning (ML) based
detection of malicious entities [22, 78, 90, 119, 125], where some techniques’ de-
tection rates exceed 99% at times [77, 79].
Machine Learning (ML) refers to a set of algorithms and statistical models
that systems use to perform tasks by relying on patterns and inference instead
of explicit instructions [88]. ML algorithms build mathematical models based on
sample data, also known as training data, to make predictions or decisions on
other sample data, that was not previously observed before. The typical approach
in ML is to extract a set of features, or attributes, from each training sample
and learn a model that labels the samples, which are presented in terms of the
former extracted features. In the case of malware detection, these algorithms
need to distinguish between malicious and benign instances, hence the focus on
classification tasks with a binary target variable.
However, Szegedy et al. [49] showed that some ML methods (including mal-
ware detection systems) are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial ex-
amples (AE) are samples an attacker manipulates, such that the sample will
be wrongly classified (e.g., malicious instances as benign). These examples are
manipulated such that they hide some properties, or adopt properties of a dif-
ferent class, such that the system misclassifies them. In the context of malware
detection, misclassification involves classifying benign samples as malicious and
vice-versa [56, 74, 145]. AE attacks are widely used in the many fields: spam fil-
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tering [91], network intrusion detection systems (IDS) [42], Anti-Virus signature
tests [92] and biometric recognition [106].
There are three basic types of attackers generating AE: the white-box at-
tacker [85, 102, 123] which has full knowledge of the classifier and the train/test
data and the black-box attacker [85, 95, 121], whose number of queries to an
oracle, access to the predicted probabilities or the predicted classes from the
model, or access to the training data are limited. Finally, the zero-knowledge
attacker [47, 75], has no prior data before the attack. A special case of adversar-
ial examples involves using evasion attacks. Evasion attacks take place when an
adversary modifies malware code so that the modified malware is categorized as
benign by the ML, but still successfully executes the malicious payload [42, 55,
79, 87, 144]. In Android malware detection systems, various studies have explored
AE-based attack methods [30, 55, 54, 83]. On the other hand, AE techniques have
also been used to robustify classifiers against Android malware [28, 55, 60].
The main contribution of this work is introducing a vulnerability in one of well
known components of Android malware detection systems, Androguard [34], and
exploiting it to allow malicious instances to be classified as benign. Androguard
implements a basic feature extraction for Android malware detection systems,
and may seem safe. However, since the Android OS continuously updates its
APIs, and due to the fact that Androguard has not been updated in this manner,
it becomes a weakspot for large numbers of Android malware detection system
that uses Androguard [3, 48, 84, 103, 122]. Given this security breach, we design
various novel evasion attacks against Android malware detection systems based
on Androguard.
We did not solely focus our analysis on the evasion rate (i.e., the rate of mali-
cious instances bypassing the classifier), as commonly done, but rather conducted
a more extensive analysis. Specifically, a closer look at the manipulated instances
of the evasion attacks revealed that some instances maintain high evasion and
maliciousness rates but do not pass a simplistic functionality test. Based on this
analysis, we conclude that further research in Android malware field should con-
sider the impact of evasion attacks in terms of: functionality, maliciousness, and
evasion rate.
2 Background
The Android OS is an open source OS, mainly based on Linux, and considered
one of the most popular mobile phone operating systems. Android was developed
by Google [52] and a group of developers known as the Open Handset Alliance [6].
The distribution of applications for this OS is basically done through application
stores such as the Google Play Store [50] or the Samsung Galaxy Store [45],
etc. In contrast to IOS, Android allows independent installation of apps hence
leaving itself open to potentially harmful ones. This makes the need for Android
malware detection systems even greater. The apps in these markets are stored
in an Android PacKage (APK) format.
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2.1 APK
An APK file is a compressed file that packs the appâĂŹs Dalvik bytecode
(Classes.dex files), compiled and plain resources, assets, and the XML mani-
fest file as depicted in Fig. 1. Dalvik bytecode (Classes.dex) files are the source
code that the app runs. The Resources folder contains graphics, string resources,
user interface layouts, etc. and complied resources is a binary file that contains
the contents of the resources. The native libraries include the outer code libraries
that are needed for the app and the Assets folder includes other outer files that
are not code files. The signatures and certificates of the apps are also included
within the APK. The certificate and signatures are used to identify the author
of the app and establish trust relationships between applications. The Android-
Manifest.xml (or Manifest file) is designed for the meta-data such as requests
for permissions, components defined in the app such as Activities, Services, etc.
Fig. 1. APK structure
One of the tags in the Manifest file is uses-permission, which specifies
a system permission the user has to grant for the app to operate correctly.
Permissions are granted by the user when the app is installed (on Android version
5.1 and lower) or while the app is running (starting from Android version 6.0).
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An example of this tag is shown in the first box in Fig. 2. A custom tag exists for
developer-specific permissions which is called permission. A newer version (on
Android version 6.0+) of the uses-permission tag is the uses-permission-sdk-
23 (the second box of Fig. 2 depicts the use of the new uses-permission tag).
Starting from version 1.0, the Android system defined Protection Levels for
each permission: Dangerous, Normal, Signature and Special [10]. From Android
version 6.0+, Permission Groups were introduced. These groups put a number
of sub-permissions requests together in the same permission tag [9] (the third
box in Fig. 2).
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
<uses-permission-sdk-23 android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
<uses-permission-sdk-23 android:name="android.permission.STORAGE"/>
Fig. 2. Examples of permission tags. Uppermost: the old uses-permission tag. Middle:
the newer version. Bottom: the use of permission groups.
A general tag included in the Manifest file is the Meta-data tag. This is
a name-value pair for an item in the Manifest file, which contains additional
data that can be supplied to the parent component. A component can contain
any number of <meta-data> sub-elements, where each meta-data tag includes
a name field and a value (which are not constrained), as depicted in Fig. 3.
<meta-data android:name="zoo" android:value="@string/kangaroo" />
Fig. 3. Example of a meta-data tag
2.2 Understanding the APK Code
As mentioned above, the APK compressed file includes bytecode dex files and a
number of other files, as shown in Fig. 1. To produce these bytecode files, we use
the APKTool [139] on the APK compressed file. This tool decompresses an APK
file into its subordinate files (and can also be used to compress these files into an
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Fig. 4. Control Flow Graph. The API call FetchE() calls getService(), getMessage()
and the function e from the log class. The e() function calls API calls getService() and
getMessage().
APK). These bytecode files are not readable or easily modified by developers.
We overcame this by implementing a disassembled code of the app’s bytecode
code, using the most common disassembled code format for Android, Smali [8,
64].
The disassembled code is composed of functional code along with various API
calls to the device components, such as Camera, GPS, Internet, etc. Each API
call is abstracted to either the family level or the package level. For example,
starting a video recording by the camera is done by the void start() method of
the android.media.MediaRecorder. In this case, the package name for this method
is android, and the family name is media. The set of API calls used by each app,
can be aggregated to a Control Flow Graph (CFG) [5], a graph featured as a
tree of API calls, based on package and family names (an example of a CFG is
presented in Fig. 4).
A thorough exploration of the dissassembled code and the CFG, along with
the AndroidManifest xml file, allowed us to construct a set of novel attacks. A
flaw in the manipulation of the APK may cause a crash in the repacking [23,
66] of the app, or when installing and running the app on the phone. While the
manipulation in these cases succeeded in fooling the classifier, it had no attack
impact.
2.3 Androguard
Several tools have been introduced over the years to fully examine an APK. In
contrast to APKtool, Androguard [34] is a popular open-source python based
tool to dissect an APK. Androguard can be used both as a command line tool
and an imported package for python scripts. A large portion of Android mal-
ware detection systems incorporate Androguard [3, 4, 14, 19, 26, 27, 38, 48, 39, 69,
72, 80, 84, 96, 100, 101, 103, 122, 124, 136, 137, 142, 143]. When analyzing an APK,
Androguard efficiently extracts features such as API calls, CFG graph, permis-
sions, Activities, Package names, etc. Androguard analyzes both the Manifest
file and the smali code files to extract specific features. It uses cross references
(XREFs) to identify Classes, Methods, Fields and Strings. XREFs work in two
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directions: xref_from and xref_to. Xref_to means that the current object is
calling another object. xref_from means that the current object is called by
other object. These connections enable Androguard to visualized the XREFs as
an directed graph (CFG). For the Manifest file, Androguard uses axml parser.
For example, to get the requested permissions, Androguard parses the Manifest
file and enumerates the permission names from the uses-permission tags.
3 Related Work
In this section, we survey well known ML-based detection systems for Android
malware. We discuss three main approaches. The first is a static analysis, which
includes gathering string values from the Manifest file and the smali code files.
The second approach follows the CFG of the application, which traces the con-
nection between API calls used in the app. The third approach inspects the
behavior of the app and gathers information on the OS’s behavior during the
run of the app, along with network usage, etc.
In addition, we describe two evaluations of Android ML detection systems.
We also depict several popular evasion attacks targeting the detection systems.
We discuss three forms of attack. The first form engages in the art of camouflage,
where the attacker tries to hide strings and values of the app that may pinpoint
malicious content using obfuscation and encryption. The second form adds noises
to the app, e.g., non-invoked functions. The last form tries to change the flow of
the app. It analyzes the previous flow of the app, and changes the code of a few
function calls.
Next, we describe several Android malware permission based detection sys-
tems. Since this paper introduces several evasion attack vectors that focus on
Android permissions, we discuss state of the art works that deal with these
attributes.
Last, we examine the functionality and maliciousness tests of Android mal-
ware. To the best of our knowledge, these parameters have not been fully ex-
plored in previous works in the Android malware field.
3.1 Android malware ML-based detection systems
One of the best-known Android malware detection systems is Drebin [13]. Drebin
gathers syntactic features, and collects eight types of features from the APKs.
Four features are extracted from the manifest file which include permissions re-
quested from the user, software/hardware components residing in the app and
intents that were run in the app. Four other features are gathered from the smali
code, which include suspicious/restricted API calls, used permissions in the app’s
run and URL addresses. The DroidAPIMiner [1] is similar to Drebin, in that API
calls and permissions are inspected. The authors performed a dataflow analysis
to recover frequently used APIs and package names. They used multiple ML al-
gorithms, where KNN dominated the other techniques with a 0.99 accuracy rate.
A similar approach to DroidAPIMiner can be found in DroidMat [141], where
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other features from the AndroidManifest XML file were inspected, including the
app components (such as intents and activities), aside from the app permissions.
MalPat [131] analyzed the use of API calls in relation to permissions in the apps
(based on the Pscout [16] tool) to find malicious patterns. A recent example of
syntactic feature analysis is Dejavu [113], which merges static features analysis
with code to compare benign against malicious apps. The Android malware de-
tection systems using static analysis tap several features from the app. These
features are easy to understand and deploy, and do not require a great deal of
computing resources from the operator. However, since most of the static fea-
tures can be mined efficiently, they can also be manipulated without consuming
a lot of computing resources [32, 86, 89, 105].
A different approach can be found in MaMaDroid [94], which extracts features
from the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of an application. MaMaDroid creates a
tree of API calls based on package and family names. After abstracting the
calls, the system analyzes the API call set performed by an app, to model its
true flow. The authors built a statistical Markov chain [67] model to represent
the transitions between the API calls. Backes et al. [18] used a similar approach
to detect malicious third party libraries in apps. A different perspective that used
a similar approach to MaMadroid was presented by Sahs et al. [110], who used
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [129, 116] on permissions and CFG. The authors
merged jumps and code blocks to reduce the CFG. They used several kernels on
the outputs of the above, and labeled nodes in the CFG based only on the last
instruction of the block it represents. Salem et al. [112, 115] reported that API
calls traces may be good indicators of malicious behavior. The authors injected
anomalous API calls into benign API call traces. They calculated the likelihood
of an API call sequence. A low value suggested a malicious app. The authors ran
Droidutan [111] to get the trace of benign apps. Then, they injected several API
calls as a block of operations. The authors used a Hidden Markov Model [36,
40, 46] to create a model from the benign apps. They achieved an accuracy
rate ranging from 0.64-0.99. However, since they used blocks of codes, scattered
malicious API calls remained unaddressed. Hou et al. [59] inspected API call
sequences. The authors categorized the sequences by code blocks, package names
and invoke types (from the smali [8] code). These functions describe the similarity
between API calls. The authors use HIN to fully analyze the connections between
each category. They achieved a maximum accuracy rate of 98.6 while using the
three categories. Monitoring the control flow/ API call set of the app seems
like a better idea than the syntactic approach. Changing the flow of the app is
more complicated, since the CFG may be complex. Furthermore, a change to the
sequence of API calls of the app may damage the functionality of the malicious
app, or its maliciousness. However, evasion attacks that manipulate the flow of
the app such as as [30, 62, 86, 99, 128] succeed in deceiving this kind of detection
systems.
Several evaluations have been conducted on Android malware detection sys-
tems. Roy et al. [108] conducted a large survey on ∼ 1M apps and several An-
droid malware detection systems (e.g., Drebin [13]) and malware datasets (like
When the Guard failed the Droid: A case study of Android malware 9
the Genome malware project [146]). For verification, the authors used VT [134]
(which we use in a similar manner). The results revealed a difference of 60% in
the true positive rate (TPR) between apps that were identified by at least 10
VT scanners and the apps that were identified by fewer than 10 scanners. The
authors also examined Android malware detection systems to see whether the
number of features could be reduced and still maintain a high detection rate.
For example, the authors showed that Drebin’s [13] feature set could be reduced
to ∼ 2K and still preserves an accuracy rate of 99%.
Pendlebury et al. [97] conducted a performance analysis on Android malware
detection systems using Drebin, MaMaDroid and Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
algorithm [57]. The authors created a metric to test the performance of these
detection systems correctly. This metric implements ratios of old and new apps,
and benign/malicious classes in the training and test data. The ratio of 90/10
between benign and malicious apps is based on an evaluation of the distribution
of benign and malicious classes in the real world. These proportions make the
classifiers more robust to new malware. Note that the current study adopted
some of the recommendations put forward in this paper.
The third approach involves the use of several parameters such as CPU,
network usage, number of running processes, and battery levels along with other
system features. This approach was introduced in Andromaly [118]. The authors
inspected two sets of apps: games and tools. The authors found that games could
be differentiated more easily into benign and malicious because of the unique
features of these apps. A similar approach was taken by Shabtai et al. in [120,
117]. Behavioral detection methods are based on the behavior of the Android
device while running the malicious and benign apps. These behaviors may be
device-dependent. Therefore, a dataset based on behaviors may suffer from high
diversity. In addition, applying these methods as a host-based method as was
done in [120] without a global dataset will fail when a new device is used.
Nissim et al. [93] used Active Learning (AL) methods and a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classification algorithm to detect Android malware using static
analysis. The authors tried to identify malicious signatures using AL along with
judgments by a human cyber expert. Although a human interaction enhances
the detection rate, it interferes with the autonomy of the detection system and
its automatic process.
For more information of Android malware ML detection systems, see [20, 70].
3.2 Evasion attacks on ML-based detection systems
Evasion attacks against ML-based detection systems can take multiple courses.
One course of action is to camouflage specific features of the app. One well-known
example of camouflage is the use of obfuscation or encryption. Demontis et
al. [32] used obfuscation of suspicious string values, APIs, and packages. Another
example of camouflage is packing an app inside another app. DaDidroid [62]
used a similar approach as found in Demontis et al. [32] by adding packing to
the obfuscation methods. The authors wrapped the original Android malware
inside another app.
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Reflection, which allows a program to change its behavior at runtime, is also
a classic evasion method. Rastogi et al. [105] presented an attack which uses the
Demontis et al. [32] approach along with reflection.
A typical approach to evasion attacks on ML-based detection systems in-
cludes adding noise to the app, thus misleading the classifier’s assignment of
benign and malicious app. An example of the use of this approach can be found
in Android HIV [30] where the authors implemented non-invoked dangerous
functions against Drebin and a function injection against MaMaDroid. Another
option is to use Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to add noises to the
classification process. Shahpasand et al. [121] used GAN to add features from
the Drebin log file to a malicious app sample.
Changing the app flow is another approach. Here a detection system that is
based on analyzing the app flow, like MaMaDroid, fails to detect the malicious
app [30, 62]. Stub function4 can also be used to break the app flow [30, 99, 128],
resulting in an ML misclassification of a malicious app.
Our evasion attacks use obfuscation methods to conceal the appearance of
API calls. In addition, we use reflection on the obfuscated API calls to imple-
ment a more complex adversary. Also, we enhance our attacks with special focus
on the Manifest file, thus implementing new attack methods such as Manifest
Pockets (which we will explain later) and other Mainfest based attacks. We do
not incorporate noise or change of the app flow in our evasion attacks.
3.3 Permission-based detection systems
System permissions are one of the core components of every operating system.
Since Android is an OS, it incorporates system permissions requests from the
user to get system resources as a uses-permission tag in the Manifest file con-
taining a constant string name of a permission. A system resource that is used
by an app but is not requested from the user will cause a failure. Therefore,
correct permission requests are a vital component for an APK. Also, specific
combination of permission requests may pinpoint malicious activity. For exam-
ple, a combination of the Internet and Phone state permission requests may be
a trace of stealing phone numbers and sending them to a third party site. For
these reasons, the permission requests are considered as straightforward features
for Android malware detection systems. In this section we will discuss several
Android malware permission based detection systems.
Kirin [37] was one of the first known Android malware permission based
detection systems. This rule based security system for Android inspects the
use of Android permissions of an app against a list of rules at install time.
The authors evaluated their system against 311 apps from the Android market,
where 10 apps raised alerts. Five of the suspicious apps asserted a dangerous
configuration of permissions, but were used within reasonable functional needs
based on application descriptions. The other 5 apps were categorized by the
4 A stub function is a function that basically does not do anything, but may change
the flow of an app.
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authors as potentially malicious and needing care when installed. Therefore,
they concluded that their technique requires user involvement for approximately
1.6% of the applications. Unfortunately, as the rules of Kirin are contant and
specific for a small number of permission requests, new and updated malicious
apps can easily evade this kind of detection system.
Another approach in permission-based detection systems is the relations be-
tween permission requests. Rassameeroj et al. [104] produced a permission adja-
cency matrix for every two permissions found in an app. These were converted to
a graph where the nodes were permissions, and the weights on the edges repre-
sented the frequency of the corresponding permission concurrence. The authors
also calculated the apps’ adjacency matrix. Each app was represented by a bi-
nary vector where each element represented the request of a specific permission.
Based on the Euclidean distance between vectors as similarity, a graph was built,
where the nodes were apps and the weights on the edges represented the simi-
larities between apps. Using Kirin’s [37] dangerous permissions detection, they
detected APKs could contain malicious operations. Therefore, their detection
system suffers from the same exploits as Kirin.
A more recent study on permissions in [11] described correlations between
permission pairs. Here, detection is based on graphs of relations between per-
missions in malicious and benign datasets. In the train phase, each permission
was converted to a node. For each sample, an edge with weight 1 was created
between pairs of permissions included in the app. If the edge existed, its weight
was increased by 1. In the testing phase, the sum of weights was calculated in
both graphs. The label for the sample was determined by the maximum value
between the sum of permission pairs in the malicious graph and the sum of
permission pairs in the benign graph. As their study was static, they could not
detect updating apps at runtime. The authors noted that apps with one or two
permissions were misclassified.
Droid Detective [81] is a detection system based on Android permission com-
binations. This system runs from k=1 to 6 to find combinations of permission
sets that can be found on malicious and benign apps. Then, a selection algorithm
is run on the results. The selected sets are used as security rules. They found
that the larger the value of k, the more accurate the detection is. Almost all
the permission combinations that they found to be malicious included a SMS
affiliated permission.
Droid Permission Miner [15] studied the permissions in the intersection of
malicious and benign apps, the union of both, and in each class that was not
in the other. The authors used Bi-Normal separation [44, 43] (BNS) and Mutual
Information [21] for their feature selection. Using BNS, they produced the top
30, 25, 20, 18 and 15 features and the bottom 30, 25, 20, 18 and 15 features
as options for the classification algorithms. Their classification algorithms were
NaÃŕve Bayes, AdaBoost M1 with J48 as the base classifier, J48, Random forest
and IBK-5. They found that the intersection group between the malicious and
benign apps was the best identification group.
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The use of maliciousness score is explored in the permission-based detection
systems. In APK Auditor [130], the authors presented a client-server based sys-
tem that calculates a malware rank based on the app’s requested permissions.
A permission malware score (PMS) was calculated for each permission using its
existence in all malware apps. Then, an Application’s Malware Score (AMS) was
calculated by summing all its permissions’ PMSs. The authors used logistic re-
gression [58] to measure the malware threshold limit. A similar approach to the
permissions risk score was introduced in [98]. Forensic Analysis of Mobile devices
Using Scoring of application permissions (FAMOUS) [72] introduced permission
scoring in APKs. The authors used the scoring of permission requests to detect
malicious and benign apps. They counted the occurrences of permission requests
in both benign apps (PuB) and malicious apps (PuM). The authors divided both
counters in the correlative group size (B for benign, M for malicious), and cre-
ated BSP and MSP. An Effective Maliciousness Score of Permission (EMSP) was
calculated as the final score or a permission: EMSP = MSP - BSP. They defined
the Maliciousness score by accumulating the EMSPs of the permissions each app
requested. They calculated the EMSPs and MS score of each app as features of
ML algorithms they have implemented. They tested RF, SVM, KNN, NB, and
CART, where RF dominated all other algorithms.
Tree classifiers are one of the most popular machine learning algorithms.
Several Android malware detection systems are solely based on these classifiers.
Aung et al. [17] proposed permission-based Android malware detection systems
using tree classifiers. They used K-means [135, 71] to cluster the data. Then, they
used decision trees on each cluster. The decision tree classifiers were - j48 [24,
109], RF, CART [33, 126]. The most promising algorithm was RF. Droiddet [147,
2] focused on permissions, permission-rate, monitoring system events and some
sensitive APIs. They introduced the PERMISSION-RATE formula, which is the
number of permissions an app requested divided by the size of the smali code files
of the apps. They posited that the PERMISSION-RATE of the malware should
ordinarily be higher than the benign rate. An app that provides various functions
means that it will require a large of number of permissions. They used Rotation
Forests [107, 73] as their classifier5. The rotation forest adopted principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) [140] to handle the feature subset randomly extracted for
each base classifier to intensify the diversity. To encourage the diversity, boot-
strap samples were employed as the training set for the base classifiers, as in
bagging.
Finding the exact feature set is another course in malware detection. SIG-
PID [127] tried to find the minimum subset of permissions for Android malware
detection that maintained similar values in precision, recall, accuracy and F-
score as using the full permission set. The authors evaluated the permissions
that were frequently requested by benign apps and malicious apps. In addition,
permissions that were paired in most apps were represented by only one of them.
Their final permission set size was 22. ESID [63] is an enhanced SIGPID system.
5 Rotation Forest Classifier is an ensemble classifier where each base classifier is trained
on the entire dataset.
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The first stage in ESID is feature selection, where a specific permission with a
frequency lower than c is eliminated both in the malicious and benign data. The
authors reduced the features set to 38 - 47 features.
Overall, the mutual hypothesis of these permission-based detection systems
is that permissions must be declared by the uses-permission tags in the manifest
files. There is no other option available. The detection systems must acquire
these permission requests to work. However, as we explore in this study, this
assumption is false. There is another option to request permissions from a user.
We sample several permission-based detection systems in this study to prove our
point.
3.4 Functionality and maliciousness tests
The main goal of evasion attacks is to avoid detection by malware detection sys-
tems. However functionality and maliciousness tests can be conducted to assess
their impact. These aspects were explored in Repackman [114], a tool that auto-
mates the repackaging attack. The authors studied 100 apps from Google play,
and successfully repackaged 86% of the apps with random payloads that main-
tained the functionality of the previous apps. They performed 2 tests on their
repackaging attack, all using Droidutan [111]. For the functionality test (which
they termed feasibility), they used random UI actions. For maliciousness, which
they termed reliability, they measured the apps that successfully executed their
payload via recorded screenshots. To the best of our knowledge, these function-
ality and malicious content tests have not been discussed in previous research in
the field of Android malware evasion attacks.
Our functional app test is different in that we test the initial state of the
app when it is started in an emulator. We do not interact with the app itself,
because we evaluate its basic functionality. We assess the identification rate
of VT scanners as an indication of maliciousness activity. Recent studies have
began examining the strength of specific scanners against evasion attacks. This
is adopted here.
4 Metrics and Evaluations
This study implemented various metrics and evaluations. They were used to de-
fine the application dataset, assess the effectiveness of the evasion attacks against
the detection systems, and formulate insights. First, we describe the dataset and
its verification tool. We discuss dataset biases, and how we tackled them. We
discuss functionality and maliciousness tests for Android evasion attacks. We
show that if an app crashes on the functionality test, it will not cause any harm
to the user who runs it. For the maliciousness test, we compared the original An-
droid malware to the manipulated Android malware to determine whether their
reactions were similar. We tested original malicious apps and manipulated apps
as regards identification by VT malware detection scanners. The evaluations and
metrics are:
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– Data collection:
• Benign apps: We used apps from the AndroZoo dataset [7] (∼ 74K)
chosen from GooglePlay [50] market, and CICAndMal2017’s [76] dataset
(∼ 0.1K).
• Malicious apps: We used the malicious apps from the Drebin dataset
[13](∼ 5.56K), CICAndMal2017 [76] (∼ 0.4K), AMD [138] (∼ 24.5K)
and StormDroid [29] (∼ 1.6K) datasets.
• Verification: We used VirusTotal (VT) [134] to verify that our apps
were correctly labeled (i.e., malicious or benign). We define benign apps
as apps that are not marked as malicious by fewer than 3 scanners. Mali-
cious apps are apps that are identified as malicious by at least 2 to 4 [13,
97] scanners (out of 64 available scanners). We used malicious apps from
the above datasets that were identified by at least 3 scanners.
– Eliminating dataset biases: Android malware detection systems suffer
from temporal and spatial biases [97]. Spatial bias is defined as unrealistic
assumptions about the ratio of benign to malicious apps in the data. Tem-
poral bias is defined as temporally inconsistent evaluations that integrate
future knowledge about the test data into the training data.
To avoid these dataset biases, we followed the suggested properties in [97].
For example, 90% of our dataset was composed of benign APKs, and the
remaining 10% were malicious, similar to the distribution of global benign
and Android malware apps [51, 82], thus accounting for the spatial bias. As
for the temporal bias, we trained the classifiers with apps whose timestamp
was set prior to the test data.
– Robustness evaluation: To evaluate robustness, we computed the pro-
portion of malicious instances for which the classifier was evaded; this is
our metric of evasion robustness, with respect to the robustness of the de-
tection system (similar to the analysis provided in [133]). Thus, an evasion
robustness of 0% means that the classifier was successfully evaded every
time, whereas an evasion robustness of 100% means that the evasion failed
in every instance. We compared the the evasion robustness of each evasion at-
tack to the original malicious APKs detection rates of each detection system.
– Functionality: We evaluated the functionality of each manipulated app.
In an evasion attack, the attacker tries to hide the malicious activity from
the detection system. Constructing an evasion attack with existing Android
malware involves changing the APK, which is a sensitive job. For exam-
ple, a line that describes invoking a method: "invoke-virtual{v0, p2,
v1},Ljava/lang/Class;->getDeclaredMethod(Ljava/lang/String;
[Ljava/lang/Class;)". This line assumes that the first argument stores a
class object (v0), a string is stored in the second argument (p2), and an array
of class objects is stored in the last argument (v1). If one of the arguments
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contains primitives or different objects than stated, the app crashes. This is
defined as to a situation in which an error occurs during an app’s run which
lead to the app’s process kill. Automation of feature changes may result in
this kind of error (or other errors), resulting in a crash. If the crash occurs
in early stages of the run, the malicious content will probably not damage
the user at all. Therefore, evaluation of the app’s functionality is vital when
generating an APK evasion attack. The functionality test has two steps: the
app is installed and run on an Android emulator [53]. If the app crashes, it
is concluded that it is not functional. A manipulated app that passes this
test is declared a functional app.
– Malicious Activity/Maliciousness: A maliciousness check is an exten-
sion of a functionality check. Whereas a manipulated app that passes the
previous check can be considered a threat to the user, it does not guarantee
that the former malicious content will run similarly to the former Android
malware. Some of the activities the malware runs may fail or change drasti-
cally as a result of the manipulation of the Android malware. Therefore, a
maliciousness test of the app is needed. The maliciousness check measures
the similarity between the previous Android malware and their manipulated
counterparts. These tests took place in the following steps. First, we scanned
the original malicious app using VT. Then, we scanned the manipulated app
in the same way. If the number of scanners that detect the manipulated app
was less or equal to the number of scanners identifying the original malicious
app, this app passed our maliciousness test.
– Permissions inspection:We analyzed the use of permissions in the dataset.
This was done by splitting the inspection into two groups: benign apps and
malicious apps to better understand how the permissions requests for each
group differed. We used Android’s protection levels (see in Section 1) to
map the behavior of each group. We inspected two properties of each group:
1. General protection level use:We extracted the requested permissions
from each AndroidManifest.xml file of each app. Then we mapped the
permissions to their protection levels and accumulate the use of each
protection level from the application to its group.
2. Dominant protection level: The same process as in the general case,
but this only accumulated the dominant protection level of each app. In
other words, the goal was to find the most frequent protection level used
in each app and assign it to the relevant group.
– Permission Families: We analyzed the statistics of permissions use in the
benign and malicious groups and to do so created permission families. Each
family contained at least one permission. The families were created in a re-
cursive approach. This consisted of inspecting each permission separately to
obtain their distribution in the group. Then, for each one of them, a different
permission was added recursively and the distribution of the permission pair
was inspected. This process was then extended to permission triplets, per-
mission quadruplets, etc. which we term permission families. The rationale
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for creating these families is to understand the behavior of permissions in
each group. An attacker that acquires this information can create an evasion
attack that mimics the use of permissions such as a benign app.
5 Attacker models
In this section, we describe three attacker models. The first two models depict
an attacker that has black-box [85, 95, 121] access to the trained classifier. The
third model is a zero knowledge attacker. We describe the initial evaluation of the
trained classifier, which is needed to assess the baseline for the evasion attacks.
Then we describe the two types of data used in our attacker models: Drebin
reports and Permission families statistics. This is followed by a description of the
attacker models: Model Access, Data Access and Zero Knowledge. To enhance
the readability of Sections 5 and 6, an abbreviation table is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Abbreviations for the Attacker models and Evasion attacks
MA Model Access (attacker model).
DA Data Access (attacker model).
ZK Zero Knowledge (attacker model).
MB Manifest Based (evasion attack).
SB Smali Based (evasion attack).
5.1 Initialization phase
Each attacker model started with an initial evaluation of the classifier detection
rate, as depicted in Fig. 5. The following steps were carried in this phase:
1. The attacker sends malicious APK test samples to a trained classifier. The
trained classifier was trained on our benign and malicious APK dataset which
was described in Section 4. The classifier returns a label for each APK.
2. The adversary accumulates these outputs to come up with the detection
rate, which we denote the initial detection rate.
5.2 Drebin reports
Drebin is a lightweight method for the detection of Android malware. In this
section, we describe the report Drebin produces on APKs. For a full description
of the Drebin classifier, see [13] (implementation is available at [12]).
During its run, Drebin creates the following observations on each APK sam-
ple:
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Fig. 5. The initial step of the attack models. The attacker sends malicious APK test
samples to the trained classifier (1). Then, the classifier produces a set of labels of
the apks. The attacker accumulates these labels to formulates the detection rate as an
initial detection rate of the malicious APKs (2), which we term the Initial detection
report.
1. Component lists: The observations included are IntentActionList, Ser-
viceList, ActivityList, and BroadcastReceiverList. These observations are ob-
tained from the manifest file by following the corresponding components
tags; namely, Intent, Service, Activity, Receiver.
2. Requested Permissions: These observations describe the permissions that
were requested from the user. Drebin maps them according to the Uses-
Permission tags from the manifest file.
3. Suspicious APIs: These observations in the Drebin report relate to a con-
stant number of APIs defined in the system. Examples of suspicious API
calls are setWifiEnabled() and sendTextMessage().
4. Restricted APIs and Used Permissions: The classifier includes a dic-
tionary called SmallCasePScoutPermApiDict.json that maps API calls to
permissions. Drebin looks for these calls to understand which permissions
are used by the app. Next, it lists the permissions that correspond to per-
missions that were requested in the manifest asUsed Permissions. Finally,
it adds the API calls that were mapped to permissions that were not men-
tioned in the manifest file as Restricted API calls.
5. URLDomains: The classifier lists the URLs mentioned in the smali code
files.
Overall, the steps in Drebin’s report creation are as follows:
1. Drebin saves the original labels of each app.
2. During the training process, Drebin inspects each training sample (APK
file). It assigns each observation a corresponding weight Ws and sums these
weights.
3. Using SVM, Drebin computes the maximum weight that corresponds to a
benign app as t.
4. In the test phase, Drebin scans the test samples, labels each feature in each
app with a weight according to its training phase. It saves the weights and
labels in Explanations.json (see Fig. 6 for an example).
5. In the test phase, if ΣWs > t, Drebin predicts a label of 1 (malicious). Oth-
erwise, it predicts the label of -1. It saves the weights and labels in Explana-
tions.json (see Fig. 6 for an example), which saves the Drebin reports.
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Fig. 6. Drebin report of an APK. This report is associated with a benign app, since
the original label is -1, which stands for benign. As can be seen, the weights for each
observation are 0. Therefore, the predicted label for the app is -1.
An attacker that has access to Drebin’s reports is able to scan the output
of the trained Drebin classifier on samples it obtained and sent to Drebin. The
adversary has only a black-box access to Drebin. In addition, the attacker focus
solely on the observations with Ws > 0. Since an observation associated with
Ws = 0 is not considered important in Drebin, it is not included in the evasion
attack process.
5.3 Permission family statistics
The permission families, as described in Section 4, classify the distribution of
permission requests into benign and malicious apps in the data. An attacker
that has access to these statistics understands how to resemble a benign app.
For example, if a top permission family is [ X,Y,Z] and a malicious app requests
permission [A,X,B,Y,Z,C] , the attacker will conceal permission requests [ A,B,C]
to mimic the benign app.
5.4 MA attacker model
The first attacker model is called Model Access. This model has access to
Drebin’s reports (and therefore, to the APKs’ classifications). Drebin maps sig-
nificant syntactic features from each APK in a report (described in detail in
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Section 5.2). Therefore, its output reports focuses the attacker on the important
features it needs to conceal. The attacker does not need the data itself (unlike in
to Section 5.5). It is guided by Drebin. The attacker follows the following steps:
1. The attacker uses the malicious APK test samples as input to Drebin.
2. Drebin outputs its reports.
3. The attacker uses Drebin’s report as part of the manipulation process. It
focuses on the significant observations.
4. The manipulated APKs are sent as input to the trained classifier.
5. The classifier produces the labels from the APKs. The attacker accumulates
them and generates the final detection rate.
Finally, the attacker compares the final detection rate with the Initial detec-
tion rate from the initialization phase (Section 5.1).
Fig. 7. Model Access attacker model - The attacker runs a Drebin trained classifier
with the malicious APK test samples (1). Drebin produces a report for each APK (2).
Then, the attacker analyzes the reports to decide which features it needs to manipulate
to create the manipulated APKs (3). The manipulated APKs are used as input to the
trained classifier (4). Then, the classifier produces the set of labels of the APKs. The
attacker accumulates them to create a detection rate of the manipulated APKs (5).
The attacker compares this detection rate to the Initial detection rate from the
initialization phase (Section 5.1).
5.5 DA attacker model
The second attacker model is called Data Access. This model has access to the
dataset used to train the classifier. As discussed in Section 4, permission families
can help understanding the deep connections between permissions in benign and
malicious apps. The attacker proceeds as follows:
1. The adversary analyzes the train apps to get the permissions families.
2. The attacker uses insights on the permission families from the benign train
data to efficiently manipulates the malicious APK test samples.
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3. The manipulated APKs are sent to the trained classifier.
4. The classifier produces the set of labels for the manipulated APKs. The
adversary generates the final detection rate from accumulation of the labels.
Finally, the attacker compares the final detection rate to the Initial detection
rate from the initialization phase (Section 5.1).
Fig. 8. Data Access attacker model - The attacker gains insights on the permission
families from the benign train data (1). It uses this information to efficiently manip-
ulates the malicious APK test samples (2). The manipulated APKs are sent to the
trained classifier (3). Finally, the classifier produces labels for the manipulated APKs.
The adversary accumulates these labels and generates the final detection rate (4). The
attacker compares this detection rate to the Initial detection rate from the initial-
ization phase (Section 5.1).
5.6 ZK attacker model
The third attacker model is called Zero Knowledge. This model has access only
to the trained classifier as a blackbox, with no access to any external data. The
adversary follows the following steps:
1. The attacker blindly manipulates the malicious APK test samples.
2. The manipulated APKs are used as input for the trained classifier.
3. The classifier produces a set of labels for the manipulated APKs. The at-
tacker accumulates the labels and creates a final detection rate.
Finally, the attacker compares the final detection rate to the Initial detection
rate from the initialization phase (Section 5.1).
6 Evasion attacks
Based on the attacker model, an evasion attack should be engineered that trans-
fers the embedded knowledge of the model to a manipulated APK that will be
classified as benign. In this section we suggest a set of evasion attacks. Each
attack is characterized using a tuple, which we term Attack tuple (Section 6.1).
Then, we describe a general attack template in Section 6.2, that is common to
all the attacks. Then we describe each attack.
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Fig. 9. Zero Knowledge attacker model - The attacker blindly manipulates the ma-
licious APK test samples (1). The manipulated APKs are used as an input for the
trained classifier (2). Finally, the classifier produces a set of labels for the APKs. The
adversary generates the final detection rate (3) from the accumulation of the labels.
The attacker compares this detection rate to the Initial detection rate from the
initialization phase (Section 5.1).
6.1 Attack tuple
Each attack in this paper integrates different parameters. Therefore, we define
the Attack Tuple (AM,S,M), where:
1. AM represents the attacker model: Model Access attacker (as described in
Section 5.4), Data access attacker (as described in Section 5.5), and Zero-
knowledge attacker (as described in Section 5.6)
2. S stands for access to the Smali code files. The attacker may or may not have
access to the smali code files of the APKs it tries to manipulate. In other
words, S defines whether the attacker manipulates the smali code files. We
use a binary bit, where 1 means access granted and 0 means no access to the
smali files.
3. M refers to access to the Manifest file. The adversary may or may not have
access to the Manifest file it wants to manipulate. We use a binary bit, where
1 indicates access granted and 0 indicates no access to the Manifest file.
6.2 General Attack template
In this section, we describe a general attack template. Each attack vector in our
study manipulates other features. However, a basic template is implemented in
each which follows Algo. 1. The template consists of the following steps:
1. The algorithm’s input is an APK and additional data if present (Drebin
report/permission families list).
2. Depackage the APK to the Manifest file, smali code files and other subordi-
nate files (line 2).
3. Run the attack vector using the Manifest file, smali code files, other subor-
dinate files and the additional data (line 3).
4. Repackage the APK (line 4), and return it as an output (line 5).
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Algorithm 1 General attack template
1: procedure General Attack(APK, [Add_data])
2: Manifest, Smali...← depackage(APK)
3: Manifest, Smali...← Attack_V ector(Manifest, Smali..., [Add_data])
4: APK ← Repackage(Manifest, Smali...)
5: return APK
6: end procedure
6.3 Manifest Based attack vectors
For these attack vectors, the attacker exploits a weak spot in the classifier;
namely, the fact that it does not check for any manipulated content in the
Manifest file. The following attack vectors manipulated parts of the Manifest file,
mostly the permissions the app requests. Definitions are provided first. Then,
we describe four attack vectors that focus on the Manifest file.
The native permission tag in the Manifest file is Uses-Permission. This tag
specifies a system permission that the client has to grant the app. A newer version
(on Android version 6.0+) of the uses-permission tag is Uses-Permission-sdk-
23. From Android version 6.0+, Permission Groups were introduced. These
groups place a number of sub-permissions requests together in the same per-
mission request. For example, the READ_SMS and WRITE_SMS are included
in a SMS permission. XInclude is an unfamiliar mechanism in XML, which
merges XML documents by including one XML file in the other. An inclusion
example is depicted in Fig. 10. The included XML content is not explicitly du-
plicated. Instead, the inclusion takes place during the parsing of the XML file
and is written as an inclusion tag with a reference to a file where the content is
placed. The Android operating system needs the content of the Manifest file to
run the app. When the classifier inspects the Manifest file it searches for specific
features. It does not run a full parsing process on the Manifest file. Therefore, it
ignores XInclude tags. One may assume that this attack results in a functional
app since Android parses the Manifest file, including the merger of inclusion tags.
However, we noticed that Android ignores these tags but the included content is
not included at all, which makes the app non-functional. This phenomenon was
observed in all XInclude uses. The attack vectors included in the manifest based
attack vectors are:
1. Manifest based attack type 1 (MA,0,1): The attacker scans the report
from Drebin (full details in Section 5.2) in parallel to the Manifest file. For
the observations from the Requested Permission section, it uses one of the
following directions to conceal the requested permissions:
(a) Switch the uses-permission constant permission to its superior group
constant. Most of the classifiers follow the rules of permission definitions
from 2014. Therefore, they do not map these new permission definitions6.
6 We found that Android emulators with SDK 29 that correlates to Android 6.0+
ignore these permission requests as well. Therefore, the user was not asked to grant
these permissions, and when such permission was needed by the app, the app crashed.
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<inn>...</inn>
<example
xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<xi:include href="text.xml"/>
</example>
<example
xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<inn>...</inn>
</example>
Fig. 10. Inclusion tag example. The first box is the contents of test.xml file. The second
shows an example tag that includes a xi:include inner tag. In the last box, the included
tag is replaced at runtime by the included test.xml file contents.
(b) Cut the permissions from the AndroidManifest.xml file. Then, create
another XML file, say AndroidMan.xml and paste the permissions into
AndroidMan.xml. Put an inclusion tag in place of the former permissions
in the AndroidManifest.xml.
For observations regarding components of the app (activities, receivers, in-
tents), the attacker moves the component tag from the Manifest file to a
newly created XML file. Finally, it inserts a XInclude tag to replace the
former component tag in the original file. The complete attack procedure is
depicted in Algo. 2, which follows the following steps:
(a) The functionâĂŹs input are the files depackaged from the APK and a
list of observations produced by Drebin on this APK.
(b) For each observation s with Ws > 0, run lines 3-10 (line 2).
(c) Find the observation in the Manifest (line 3).
(d) If it is a component (line 4), the chosen function is XInclude (line 5).
(e) Otherwise, it is a permission (line 6). Run Random_Func to choose
randomly between replacing the permission constant with its superior
group constant to XInclude mechanism (line 7).
(f) Run the chosen function on observation s and update the manifest
(line 9).
(g) Return the manipulated manifest file and all the other depackaged files
as output (line 11).
2. Manifest based attack type 2 (MA,0,1): The attacker scans the report
from Drebin (full details in Section 7.2) in parallel to the Manifest file, and
finds the Requested Permission section in the scan that is correlated to the
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Algorithm 2 Manifest based attack type 1 function
1: procedure MB1_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., S)
2: for s ∈ S s.t. Ws > 0 do
3: s← find_line(s,Manifest)
4: if s is a component then
5: f ← XInclude
6: else
7: f ← Random_Func(XInclude, Permission_Group)
8: end if
9: Manifest← f(s,Manifest)
10: end for
11: return Manifest, Smali...
12: end procedure
Manifest file. Then, it switches the uses-permission tag of the permission
requests to a uses-permission-sdk-23 tag. The complete attack procedure is
shown in Algo. 3, which follows the following steps:
Algorithm 3 Manifest based attack type 2 function
1: procedure MB2_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., S)
2: for s ∈ S s.t. Ws > 0 do
3: s← find_line(s,Manifest)
4: Manifest← SDK_23(s,Manifest)
5: end for
6: return Manifest, Smali...
7: end procedure
(a) The functionâĂŹs input are the files depackaged from the APK and a
list of observations produced by Drebin on this APK.
(b) For each observation s with Ws > 0, run lines 4-5 (line 2).
(c) Find the observation in the Manifest (line 3).
(d) SDK_23: Change the uses-permission tag in s to uses-permission-sdk-
23 tag and save it to the Manifest file (line 4).
(e) Return the manipulated manifest file and all the other depackaged files
as output (line 6).
3. Manifest based attack type 3 (DA,0,1): The attacker scans the permis-
sion family statistics in parallel to the Manifest file, finds the top 3 families
from the benign apps dataset it wants to mimic. Then, it correlates the
Manifest file according to these families. For each app, it randomly picks
a family to mimic. The attacker switches the uses-permission tags of all
the permission tags that do not match a member of the family to a uses-
permission-sdk-23 tags. The complete attack procedure is shown in Algo. 4.
The algorithm takes the following steps:
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Algorithm 4 Manifest based attack type 3 function
1: procedure MB3_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., F )
2: f ← Random_Family(F )
3: for p ∈Manifest do
4: if p ∈ f then
5: continue
6: else
7: Manifest← SDK_23(p,Manifest)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return Manifest, Smali...
11: end procedure
(a) The functionâĂŹs input are the files depackaged from the APK and the
permission family statistics.
(b) Random_Family: choose randomly among the top 3 families in the
benign app statistics (line 2).
(c) For each permission p in the manifest file, run lines 4-7 (line 3).
(d) If p is part of the family, continue (line 4).
(e) SDK_23: Change the uses-permission tag in p to uses-permission-sdk-
23 tag and save it to the Manifest file (line 7).
(f) Return the manipulated manifest file and all the other depackaged files
as output (line 10).
4. Manifest based attack type 4 (ZK,0,1): The attacker blindly changes
all uses-permission tags to uses-permission-sdk-23 tags. The complete attack
procedure is shown in Algo. 5. The algorithm implements the following steps:
Algorithm 5 Manifest based attack type 4 function
1: procedure MB4_Attack(Manifest, Smali...)
2: for p ∈Manifest do
3: Manifest← SDK_23(p,Manifest)
4: end for
5: return Manifest, Smali...
6: end procedure
(a) The functionâĂŹs input are the files depackaged from the APK.
(b) For each permission p in the manifest file, run line 3 (line 2).
(c) SDK_23: Change the uses-permission tag in p to uses-permission-sdk-
23 tag and save it to the Manifest file (line 3).
(d) Return the manipulated manifest file and all the other depackaged files
as output (line 5).
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To sum up, MB1 uses XInclude and the superior permission group name. The
MB2, MB3 and MB4 attacks use uses-permission-sdk-23 tags. MB2 uses this
tag by tapping Drebin reports. MB3 uses this tag by exploiting the permission
families statistics. MB4 blindly conceals all permission requests by using the
uses-permission-sdk-23 tag.
6.4 Smali based attacks
1. Smali Based attack (MA,1,0): The attacker scans the Drebin’s report
(full details in Section 7.2) along with the smali code files. It looks for Drebin
observations related to smali code files, and specifically the Restricted APIs,
Suspicious APIs and the Used permissions. The attacker obfuscates any oc-
currence of the observation from the smali code files using several obfuscation
methods. Note that each method is a prerequisite for the next method which
is why we term each method a stage, where the input for the first stage is a
string. This string can resemble a URL address or an API call. The attack
vector stages revolve around encoding, reflection and manifest pockets:
(a) First stage - Encoding: The attacker analyzes Drebin’s observations
(report) and looks for strings in the smali code that are included in the
report; for example, a domain name, as shown in Fig. 11. The attacker
replaces the string with its base64 encoding [65], and stores the encoded
string in the variable of the former string (v5)7. Next, the attacker runs
a decode function (Landroid/util/Base64;->decode) to translate the en-
coded string back to its former representation. Note that the decoded
string is stored in the previous variable of the string (v5).
(b) Second stage - Reflection: Reflection is a well-known method in An-
droid malware [41, 106]. This stage is applicable solely for encoded strings
that resembles an API call, whereas strings that resemble a URL proceed
to the next stage. In this stage, the attacker creates a reflection call. The
reflection call creates a general object with the target object from the
API call. The next step is invoking the general object with the specific
method name from the API call. An example of a reflection call that
replaces an API call is depicted in Fig. 12. As mentioned earlier, the
API call is encoded and then transferred to the reflection object. Our
reflection object was implemented with a decoding method that decodes
the encoded string to its former string so that it can be invoked.
(c) Third stage - Manifest Pockets: In the third stage, the attacker uses
the encoded string’s content to create a meta-data tag in the Manifest.
The tag has an arbitrary name, and the value of the string. Next, the
attacker replaces the original smali code with a code that acquires the
string from the meta-data tag (see Fig. 13 for an example).
7 If the string represents an IP address, the attacker does not encode it simultaneously.
It translates it into its integer representation and then encodes it. This is done
because the IP address is basically a long integer. Therefore, encoding it as an
address will produce an error in future decoding.
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const-string v5, "http://abc.com"
invoke-virtual {p0, v6},
Lwap/cash/DownloadActivity;
->getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/lang/Object;
const-string v5, "aHR0cDovL2FiYy5jb20="
const/4 p1, 0x0
invoke-static{v5,p1},Landroid/util/Base64;-
>decode(Ljava/lang/String;I)[B
move-result-object v5
invoke-virtual{p0,v6}
,Lwap/cash/DownloadActivity;
->getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/lang/Object;
Fig. 11. Encoding a string on smali code. The "http://abc.com" string in the upper
box is replaced by its base64 translation. Then, a decode function is invoked on the
encoded string. The decoded string is placed in the former variable of the string.
Algorithm 6 Smali based attack function
1: procedure SB_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., S)
2: for s ∈ S s.t. Ws > 0 do
3: s← find_line(s, Smali)
4: Enc← Encoding(s)
5: if s is an API call then
6: Smali← Reflection(Enc, Smali)
7: end if
8: Manifest←Manifest_Pockets(Enc,Manifest)
9: end for
10: return Manifest, Smali...
11: end procedure
Algo. 6 describes the attack vector procedure, which implements the follow-
ing steps:
(a) For each observation s with Ws > 0, run steps 3-8 (line 2).
(b) Find the observation in the smali code files (line 3).
(c) Encode it with base64 encoding (line 4).
(d) If it is an API call (line 5), use reflection (line 6).
(e) Use the Manifest_Pockets method on the encoded string (line 8).
(f) Return the manipulated files and all the other depackaged files as output
(line 10).
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const-string v5, "http://abc.com"
invoke-virtual {p0,v6},
Lwap/cash/DownloadActivity;-
>getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/lang/Object;
const-string v5, "http://abc.com"
...
invoke-virtual {v0, p2, v1},
Ljava/lang/Class;-
>getDeclaredMethod(Ljava/lang/String;
[Ljava/lang/Class;)
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;
move-result-object p2
...
new-array v0, v2, [Ljava/lang/Object;
invoke-virtual{p2,p0,v6},
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;-
>invoke(Ljava/lang/Object;
[Ljava/lang/Object;)
Ljava/lang/Object;
Fig. 12. Reflection method on smali code. The getSystemService in the upper box is
replaced with a general object based on DownloadActivity and the function. Then, it
invokes the function.
2. Combined attack (MA,1,1): This attack vector combines the smali based
attack and the Manifest based attack type 1. The attacker scans the report
from Drebin (full details in Section 7.2) along with to the Manifest file and
the smali code files. For the observations from the Manifest file (permissions
and components) it uses MB1_ATTACK procedure and for the obser-
vations from the smali code it uses the SB_ATTACK procedure. Algo. 7
describes the attack vector procedure, which implements the following steps:
(a) Split the observations from Drebin into two sets - M_observations which
is a set of observations of Manifest file and S_observations which are
observations of Smali code files (line 2).
(b) Run the Smali_attack function on the observations and the smali
codes. Update the file (line 3).
(c) Run the MB1_attack function on the observations and the Manifest
file. Update the files (line 4).
(d) Return the manipulated files and all the other depackaged files as output
(line 5).
Table 2 summarizes the attack vectors and their attack tuples.
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const-string v4, "100.50.43.22"
const/16 v1, 0x22b8
invoke-direct{v2,v4,v1}
LJava/net/InetSocketAddress;-
><init>(LJava/lang/String;I)V
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest
xmlns:android="http://schemas.android
.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.example.myapp">
<application>
<meta-data android:name="1232rt"
android:value="100.50.43.22"/>
<activity ...>
</activity> </application> </manifest>
Fig. 13. The IP address string 100.50.43.22 is transferred to the Manifest file, and is
attributed a meta-data tag. The name of the meta-data tag replaces the string name
in the former smali file (which needs a number of additional functions that are not
mentioned here).
Algorithm 7 combined attack function
1: procedure Combined_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., S)
2: M_observations, S_observations← Split_Observations(S)
3: Manifest, Smali...← SB_Attack(Manifest, Smali..., S_observations)
4: Manifest, Smali...←MB1_Attack(Manifest, Smali...,M_observations)
5: return Manifest, Smali...
6: end procedure
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Table 2. Attack vectors
Attack vector Attack model Smali access Manifest access
MB1 MA 0 1
MB2 MA 0 1
MB3 DA 0 1
MB4 ZK 0 1
SB MA 1 0
Combined MA 1 1
7 Android Malware Detection Systems
In this section, we describe four Android malware detection systems: Drebin [13],
Kirin [37], Permission-Based Android Malware Detection (PB-AMD) [17], and
FAMOUS [72]. These four detection systems represent four types of Android
malware detection systems involving requested permissions. Drebin has several
features one of which is requested permissions. Kirin, PB-AMD and FAMOUS
use permission requests as their only feature. Kirin is a rule based detection sys-
tem, whereas PB-AMD is a ML detection system. FAMOUS scores permission
requests as a function of their frequency in benign and malicious apps, and cal-
culates the maliciousness of an app based on these scores. Since Kirin, PB-AMD
and FAMOUS only extract the permission requests as their feature set, their
detection system fail when permission requests are concealed. Experimenting on
these four different types of permission based detection systems led us to the
conclusion that there is an ominous vulnerability in each one of them. First, we
describe the vulnerability. Then, we discuss each detection machine we used to
assess our evasion attacks.
7.1 Vulnerability inspection
Androguard exploit Drebin, Kirin, PB-AMD and FAMOUS have two com-
ponents in common. The first is their feature extraction tool in that they all
use Androguard [34] or similar approaches to extract their features. In addition,
these systems consider permission requests from the user as a key feature. Some
systems consider the permission requests as the only feature. Therefore, taping
Androguard’s feature extraction methods, we found that Androguard fetches
permission requests by parsing the Manifest file. It searches for uses-permission
tags and lists the permission constant strings they encloses. Any change to the
structure of the uses-permission tag name or constant permission strings causes
Androguard to skip the permission request. The permission request is concealed
from the detection system. Therefore, we replaced the uses-permission name tag
with the uses-permission-sdk-23 name tag.
Permission based detection exploit A malware detection system is based on
comparing the vectors of values of benign and malicious apps in the train data.
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Therefore, a value that does not occur in any vector from the train data may
result in wrong detection. In this study, we found that there are no use of permis-
sion group superior names in the train data. Therefore, we exploited this insight
in our evasion attack and used superior permission group names instead of the
regular constant names. For example, we replaced android.permission.READ_SMS
permission constant with its superior permission group constant android.permission.SMS.
Mixture of the two exploits A combination of this two phenomena produces
the following vulnerability:
1. Replace the uses-permission name tag with the uses-permission-sdk-23 name
tag.
2. Replace the permission constant with its superior group name.
7.2 Drebin
Drebin is a lightweight method for the detection of Android malware introduced
by Daniel Arp in 2014. In this section, we only describe the full run of the Drebin
classifier. The details on the features Drebin observes can be found in Section 5.2.
Overall, the Drebin classification has the following form:
1. Drebin saves the original labels of each app. A label of -1 for is used for
benign apps, and 1 for malicious apps. It saves the original labels of each
app.
2. During the training process, Drebin inspects each training sample (APK
file). It assigns each observation a corresponding weight Ws and sums these
weights.
3. Using SVM, Drebin computes the maximum weight that corresponds to a
benign app as t.
4. In the test phase, if ΣWs > t, Drebin predicts a label of 1 (malicious).
Otherwise, it predicts the label of -1. It saves the weights and labels in
Explanations.json (see Fig. 6 for an example).
5. Drebin compares its predicted labels to the original labels of the apps, and
produces an accuracy rate.
We used an implementation of Drebin that we found on Github [12]. This version
uses Androguard, as do all the other detection machines in this section.
7.3 Kirin
Kirin [37] is a rule-based security system for Android introduced by William
Enck in 2009. It does not use ML to detect Android malware. As this code
integrates with the Andorid OS, changes to the operation system suggest that
Kirin is not likely to work well with newer versions of Android. One of the
original authors suggested using AXMLPrinter2 or Androguard to re-implement
Kirin. Kirin inspects the use of Android permissions of an app against a list of
rules at install time. The rules implemented in this system are:
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1. An application must not have the SET_DEBUG_APP permission label.
2. An application must not have PHONE_STATE, RECORD_AUDIO, and
INTERNET permission labels.
3. An application must not have PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALL, RECORD
_AUDIO, and INTERNET permission labels.
4. An application must not have ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, INTERNET,
and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETE permission labels.
5. An application must not have ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, INTER-
NET, and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETE permission labels.
6. An application must not have RECEIVE_SMS and WRITE_SMS permis-
sion labels.
7. An application must not have SEND_SMS and WRITE_SMS permission
labels.
8. An application must not have INSTALL_SHORTCUT and UNINSTALL_
SHORTCUT permission labels.
9. An application must not have the SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATION
permission label and receive Intents for the CALL action string
7.4 Permission-Based Android Malware Detection
Permission-Based Android Malware Detection [17] (which we termed PB-AMD)
was introduced by Zarni Aung in 2013. This system solves an unsupervised ma-
chine learning problem: can an unsupervised learning machine decide the correct
label for an APK based solely on its requested permissions? The first step is to
extract the permission requests. As there is no available official implementation
of this detection system, we implemented the feature extraction by Androguard.
Then, Information Gain [68] is used as their feature selection algorithm to reduce
the feature set size. The authors suggested using K-means [135, 71] to cluster the
data into benign and malicious clusters based on the permission requests. Then,
decision trees are used on each cluster. The decision tree classifiers the authors
used were j48 [24, 109], RF, CART [33, 126]. The most promising algorithm in
the original study was found to be RF, which was confirmed by our runs.
7.5 FAMOUS
FAMOUS (Forensic Analysis of Mobile devices Using Scoring of application per-
missions) [72] introduced APK permission scoring in 2018 and was developed
by Dr. Ajit Kumar. The authors used the scoring of permission requests to de-
tect malicious and benign apps. First, they counted occurrences of permission
requests in benign apps (PuB) and in malicious apps (PuM). Then, they calcu-
lated MSP = PuMM and BSP =
PuB
B (where B is the number of benign apps,
and M is the number of malicious apps). The effective Maliciousness Score of
Permission (EMSP) was calculated as the final score of the permissions: EMSP
= MSP - BSP. The authors defined the Maliciousness Score of each permission
pi by: MS=Σni=1EMSP (pi). In total, the feature set the authors used included
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EMSPs and MS. The authors used ML algorithms to predict malicious and be-
nign labels for new apps. They implemented RF, SVM, KNN, NB, and CART,
where the best performance was achieved by RF.
8 Results
We evaluated the effectiveness of our attack using the metrics from Section 4. We
ran our assessment on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4510U CPU with 2 GB RAM
with GeForce 840M GPU. The Androguard version we used (version 3.3.5) is the
latest commited version [34]. We used ∼75K benign apps and ∼32K malicious
apps (for more details on the source of our data, see Section 4). To generate a
feasible ratio of benign to malicious files [97], we used a ratio of 90/10. As we
had more malicious apps than the one-tenth of the benign apps’, we randomly
split the malicious data into 5 parts and use the whole benign dataset with each
part, separately.
In addition, we used a ratio of 80/20 between the train and test data. We
did not use the benign samples for the test data, since the goal was to assess our
attack’s evasion rate. Overall, we used ∼ 60k benign apps and ∼ 25k malicious
apps as train data, and ∼ 6k malicious apps as test data.
8.1 VT verification
Benign apps We validated that our benign apps were identified as malicious by
fewer than 3 VT scanners, as described in Section 4. We found that 92% of the
apps were not identified by any scanner, and 5% were identified by 1 scanner.
An additional 0.5% of the applications were identified by 2 scanners. Hence, the
benign dataset was verified as benign.
Malicious apps We validated that our malicious apps were identified by at
least 3 VT scanners, as described in Section 4. We found that only 0.03% of
the apps were not identified by any scanner, and 0.01% were identified by 1
scanner. No apps were identified by 2 scanners. Hence, our malicious dataset
was considered to be malicious since only 0.04% of the apps were identified by
the 3 scanners.
8.2 Evasion Robustness
To get a clearer view of the evasion robustness for each evasion attack, we eval-
uated seven cases:
1. Original malicious apps
2. MB1 attack
3. MB2 attack
4. MB3 attack
5. MB4 attack
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6. SB attack
7. Combined attack
PB-AMD and FAMOUS included multiple algorithms. Because we tested vari-
ous numbers of features and several algorithms, we could not properly express
all the options. Therefore, we picked the algorithm with the best performance
we examined which was Random Forest in both detection machines (with 100
features in PB-AMD. FAMOUS used all the default Android permissions in its
implementation).
An app that triggered an error in the evasion attacks’ construction was not
included in the manipulated test data. Some of the errors we encountered were
a result of corrupted APKs that we could not depackage or repackage. Other
errors were a consequence of faults in the manipulation process. Overall, the
error rate did not exceed 10% of the test data.
As can be seen in Table 3, the Manifest Based evasion attacks decreased all
the detection systems. Drebin sustained a 16% evasion robustness despite our
MB1 attack, and a fair evasion robustness of at least 70% with the other MB
attacks. The other machines had an evasion robustness of 0%. Since Drebin was
the only machine that extracted features outside the Manifest file, its detection
rate did not go to zero when confronting our manifest based attacks. Drebin’s
decrease in evasion robustness in the presence of MB1 manipulated apps may be
due to the fact that in this specific manifest based attack, the features we conceal
were components and requested permissions, unlike the other MB attacks which
focus solely on permissions. As the SB attack did not change any permission
requests, the evasion robustness rates of each machine remained similar to the
original apps. The combined attack associated the manipulation of both the
Manifest file and smali code files. Therefore, it affected the permission based
detection machines in a similar way as the MB attack. Drebin, because it is
based on both the Manifest and smali files, curtailed its greatest loss in all 6
attacks to 1%.
Table 3. Evasion Robustness of Kirin, Drebin and PB-AMD for each case.
Number of applications Drebin (std) Kirin (std) PB-AMD-RF (std) FAMOUS-RF (std)
Original 6327 0.964 (0.009) 0.478 (0.004) 0.872 (0.009) 0.856 (0.008)
MB1 attack 5808 0.162 (0.015) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
MB2 attack 5864 0.71 (0.037) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
MB3 attack 5850 0.784 (0.026) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
MB4 attack 5863 0.798 (0.024) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
SB attack 5817 0.84 (0.012) 0.478 (0.004) 0.872 (0.009) 0.878 (0.01)
Combined attack 5769 0.01 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
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8.3 Functionally and maliciousness tests
We then tested whether our evasion attacks would damages the functionality
and maliciousness of the previous Android malware. An evasion attack is a risky
and complex approach. The resulting app may not harm the user, because it
crashes in the initial steps of the app. We implemented the functionality test for
our apps in an emulator using Pixel 2 XL image and SDK 27. We implemented
a functionality test on each app before each evasion attack (see Section 6) and
after it. For each app, our functionality test was implemented as follows:
1. Cleaning of the emulator’s log.
2. Installation of the app.
3. Running the app for 1 second.
4. Termination of the app.
5. Uninstalling of the app.
6. Inspection of the emulator’s log for crashes.
Not all the apps in our dataset were error-free. Some of the apps that we
used were designed for an older SDK version. Other apps from our dataset
were missing some vital components and therefore were not installed properly
on the emulator. Other changes to the smali codes files and manifest file that
we implemented in our evasion attacks resulted in various runtime errors. As a
result, some of the apps crashed. Although a nonfunctional app does not attack
the user that runs it, we implemented the maliciousness test (see Section 4)
on the evasion attack apps. In our runs, some of the manipulated apps were
successfully installed but their corresponding original apps were not. Given that
the maximum difference between the original apps group and the manipulated
apps groups did not exceed 3.8%, we ignored the difference.
The results of both the functionality and maliciousness tests are depicted
in Table 4. It shows the number of apps that did not have any errors in the
manipulation process, the number of successfully installed apps and the results
for both functionality and maliciousness tests. The SD of the maliciousness test
is indicated since there were numerous options for number of scanners, whereas
the functionality test is binary. As can be seen, the original malicious apps had
a 90% functionality rate. This was the baseline for our evasion attacks. The
evasion attacks differed in functionality rate. The MB2, MB3 and MB4 evasion
attacks had a high functionality rate. In other words, over 80% of the apps
stayed functional after the manipulation. SB and the combined attack had a low
functional rate. The maliciousness rate appeared to go in the opposite direction.
The SB and combined evasion attacks had a -9.5 and -10.79 maliciousness rate.
The MB2, MB3 and MB4 attacks achieved a maliciousness rate between -7.7
to -6.05. The MB1 evasion attack appeared to be effective in terms of detection
rate, and had a fair functionality and maliciousness rates. To get a clearer view of
the maliciousness rates for each evasion attack, Table 5 presents the statistics of
the maliciousness test. We show the rates for three cases. The first case describes
the situation where the number of scanners decreased after the evasion attack
on the apps. The second case illustrates the occurrence of an equal number of
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scanners before and after our evasion attack on the apps. The third case depicts
a higher number of scanners after the evasion attack on the apps. The results
seems similar in each case.
In conclusion, whereas our evasion attacks’ apps were proved to be malicious
and decreased the accuracy rate of the detection systems, some of the manipu-
lated apps suffered considerable losses in terms of level of functionality. At the
same time, the maliciousness rate differentiated between some of the attacks.
However, the maliciousness rate of all the evasion attacks increased. In other
words, each of our attacks sustained malicious activity.
Table 4. Functionality and Maliciousness tests
Number of apps Successfully installed apps Functionality % Maliciousness test (SD)
Original 6087 4331 0.9 -
MB1 attack 5803 2728 0.56 -7.4/62.5 (2.95)
MB2 attack 5860 4501 0.82 -7.7/63.04 (3.26)
MB3 attack 5865 4501 0.82 -6.2/63.51 (2.76)
MB4 attack 5878 4491 0.82 -6.05/63.55 (2.88)
SB attack 5813 4470 0.17 -9.5/62.64 (3.48)
Combined attack 5751 2721 0.24 -10.79/64.44 (3.6)
Table 5. Maliciousness test in percent
Lower than before Equal number of scanners Higher than before
MB1 attack 0.994 0.002 0.004
MB2 attack 0.984 0.008 0.007
MB3 attack 0.988 0.005 0
MB4 attack 0.977 0.01 0
SB attack 0.998 0.0007 0.001
Combined attack 0.999 0.0003 0.0007
9 Permission inspection
9.1 Permission levels
As mentioned in Section 4, we analyzed the behavior of the benign apps and
malicious apps. We inspected the requested permissions of each group in gen-
eral, and from the dominant permission point of view. Fig. 18 depicts these
behaviours. As shown in Fig. 14, more than 60% of the benign apps fell into the
normal protection level in the general protection level use. The dominant per-
missions (in Fig. 15) had a stronger trend, ∼ 70% of the apps had a dominant
permission from the normal protection level. The malicious apps group tended
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to have balanced behavior in both the general protection level use (Fig. 16) and
the dominant protection level (Fig. 17).
This observation suggests that a randomly typical benign app is likely to
have more normal than dangerous permission requests in the manifest file. As
a result, the dominant protection level in this kind of app is also normal. This
insight can be exploited in the future in reverse: a malicious app’s permission
requests may not be dominated by a normal protection level.
9.2 Permission Families
As mentioned in Section 4, we explored permission families. The permission
family that only contains the android.permission.INTERNET permission was
found in 78.51% of the benign apps group and in 98.24% of the malicious
apps group. In other words, almost every malicious app used the internet per-
mission, as did most of the benign apps. The explanation is straightforward
since most of the apps in the world engage in network communication. There-
fore, a malicious app that camouflage its permission requests such that only
the Internet permission is detected by a permission based classifier is likely
to be classified as a benign app. The first three families for both the benign
and malicious apps are depicted in Tables 6 and 7. As can be seen, the top
three permission families in the benign apps group were found to be INTER-
NET with 78.51%, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE with 58.6% and INTER-
NET & ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE with 58.26%. The first three fami-
lies in the malicious apps group were found to be INTERNET with 98.24%,
READ_PHONE_STATE with 95.52% and INTERNET& READ_PHONE_STATE
with 95.4% (the fourth and fifth families in this group are the second and third
families from the benign apps group). It can be seen that the third family in each
group is very close to the second family in terms of percentile, and is composed
of the first and the second family. We concluded that in many benign apps, the
Internet permission is connected to the network state permission. This is un-
derstandable since using internet is closely connected to the network state. In
the malicious apps group the Internet permission appeared to be connected to
the phone state. It is important for an attacker to get the phone number of the
device, the status of any ongoing calls, etc. to evaluate the attack surface.
10 Discussion and Conclusion
Android malware detection is a popular research topic in security. Since the
number of Android users is continuously increasing, the financial gain of an effi-
Table 6. Top permission families in the benign apps dataset.
"INTERNET" 78.51%
"ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE" 58.6%
"INTERNET" ,"ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE" 58.26%
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Table 7. Top permission families in the malicious apps dataset
"INTERNET" 98.24%
"READ_PHONE_STATE" 95.52%
"INTERNET" ,"READ_PHONE_STATE" 95.4%
Fig. 14. General protection level use, be-
nign apps
Fig. 15. Dominant protection level, be-
nign apps
Fig. 16. General protection level use,
malicious apps
Fig. 17. Dominant protection level, ma-
licious apps
Fig. 18. Pie diagrams of general/dominant protection levels.
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cient and enhanced malware that evades detection has become highly attractive.
Therefore, new malware is uploaded to various application markets every minute,
taking advantage of unsuspecting users. As a countermeasure, a rising tide of
detection and prevention systems are have been in both the academic and the
industrial communities.
In this study, we explored a new vulnerability in Androguard, a well known
tool for the implementation of Android malware detection systems. This vulnera-
bility can be exploited to decrease the detection rates of many detection systems
that include requested permissions as a key feature. We showed that some de-
tection systems drop to 0% when an adversary exploits this vulnerability. Our
future work will center on analyses of this type of detection systems.
In addition, we examined what defines a successful attack on an Android
malware detection system. Is it merely the influence on the detection system’s
rate, or should we also consider other features such as the functionality and
maliciousness of the manipulated app? Our conclusion is that functionality and
maliciousness are extremely important when constructing evasion attacks. We
suggest functionality and maliciousness tests to examine the functionality and
malicious activity the app maintains after the manipulation. To demonstrate, we
proposed several novel evasion attacks that achieved different evasion rates. In
addition, the maliciousness test showed that the manipulated apps maintained
their high maliciousness value, since a greater number of VT scanners did not
recognize the apps as malicious. However, the functionality test proved that
the apps’ functionality suffered a tremendous loss, from 90% functional apps to
18%-56% functional apps in some cases. Other evasion attacks that we proposed
maintained high functionality and maliciousness rates. Therefore, the impact of
an evasion attack should be considered as a tradeoff between maliciousness and
functionality rates.
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